Alongside my day job, I advise and invest in British science and technology founders at the earliest stages, from the first cheque through to Series A. Some are building medical devices, some diagnostics, some software. One is developing a new way to detect cancer. They are clever, they work absurdly hard, and almost all of them, sooner or later, have the same conversation with me. It usually begins with the words "the Americans have offered".
Britain is very good at the first part of innovation. Our universities produce more good science than a country of our size has any right to, and the early-stage scene has improved enormously over the last twenty years: there are angel networks, seed funds and tax reliefs that simply did not exist when I started out. The trouble comes later, at the point where a company has shown that its idea works and needs serious money and its first serious customers. That is where we lose them.
We have seen this often enough that it should embarrass us. DeepMind was bought by Google in 2014. Arm, arguably the most important technology company this country has produced, was sold to SoftBank in 2016, and when it returned to the stock market in 2023 it listed in New York rather than London. Those are the famous cases. Underneath them sit hundreds of smaller ones that never make the papers: a company moves its headquarters to Boston because that is where its lead investor is, or launches in the United States first because that is where its first customer is, and the jobs, the tax receipts and the next generation of founders go with it.
In my experience three things push them out.
The first is money. A good British start-up can usually raise its first million at home. Raising twenty or fifty million is another matter, and too often that cheque comes from abroad with conditions about where the company should be based. Meanwhile British pension savings, one of the largest pools of capital in the world, have spent years drifting away from British growth companies. The recent pledges by pension providers to put more into private markets, with part of that in the UK, are a start. They are also voluntary, and modest.
The second is customers. For a health technology company the obvious first customer ought to be the NHS. In practice, getting a product approved is only the beginning. The company then has to persuade one trust after another, each with its own procurement process, budget cycle and committees, to buy something that has already been shown to work. Founders I back have spent more time on that than on building the product. The United States, for all its faults, is a large market that will pay for a product once it is cleared. So they go there first, and many never properly come back.
I have seen this from the inside. Much of my career has been spent taking diagnostics through regulators, including the first AI diagnostic for prostate cancer to be cleared by the FDA. Regulatory approval is hard, but it is a known kind of hard: you know what evidence you need and roughly how long it will take. Adoption in the NHS is the part nobody can plan for.
The third is the cost of running a business here. Employer National Insurance went up in April 2025. Business rates bear little relation to what a small firm actually earns. The schemes that encourage people to invest in young companies, EIS and SEIS, are good schemes, but they are reviewed so often that investors now price in the risk that they will change. Each of these decisions can be defended on its own terms. Taken together they tell a founder that Britain is the place to start a company and somewhere else is the place to grow it.
So what would I do? On money, I would make it easier and more attractive for British pension savings to back British growth companies, and give the British Business Bank a bigger role at the later stages, because that is where the gap is. On customers, once a product has been approved and NICE has judged it good value, there should be a single national route into the NHS instead of a separate negotiation with every trust; if it works and saves money, a hospital in Cumbria should be able to buy it on the same terms as one in Kent. On cost, I would fix the rules on early-stage investment for a decade and keep the tax burden on small employers low and predictable. A founder planning five years of growth should not have to guess what the next Budget will do.
None of this is an argument for propping up companies that cannot find customers. Plenty of the start-ups I see should fail, and some of them do. Nor would I stop a founder selling to a foreign buyer when that is the right deal for the business and the people who backed it; it is their company. My point is narrower than that. When a British company leaves, it should be because a better offer won on its merits, not because Britain never made one.
I would rather this country were known for building companies than for inventing things that other countries make money from. We have the science. What we have lacked is the patience and the plumbing to back it, and both of those are choices.
I write here in a personal capacity. I advise and invest in early-stage British science and technology companies and work in the healthcare industry, so I have a direct interest in several of the issues discussed above, and readers should bear that in mind.